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On 27th and 28th of September 2012 the fourth German-Nordic-Baltic Forum took place.  The conference was entitled “EU 
Responses to external challenges as seen from Germany, Poland, Nordic and Baltic countries and the EU neighbourhood”. Not only 
experts from the Baltic States, the Nordic States, Poland and Germany participated in the forum, but for the first time also scientists 
coming from those countries to which the EU policies are addressed. Thus, a fruitful exchange of ideas and opinions among the 
stakeholders involved on the contents of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and its perception among the partner states 
could be achieved. 
The expert seminar was organised by the Institut für Europäische Politik (IE) in cooperation with the Finnish Institute of International 
Affairs (FIIA), Helsinki and took place at the premises of FIIA. The conference was generously supported by the Federal Foreign Office 
and the Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
 
Arkady Moshes* 
THE EU-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP:  
A PATIENT IN A DEPLORABLE CONDITION 
The purpose of this paper is not to argue that EU-Russian relations are in a state of crisis. 
A workable and apparently sustainable model of economic interaction has no doubt emerged as a 
basis of this relationship. In 2011, the trade between the sides set a historic record and surpassed the 
300 billion euro threshold. The present economic interdependence can be illustrated through the use 
of a simple observation: the more Russia exports to Europe, the more it imports from Europe, and 
this propels the mutual interest. In other words; there is a positive story to tell. 
Moreover, it is well-known that “strategic partnership” is a fairly imprecise term used 
indiscreetly around the world to label quite diverse types of relationships. The sheer size of the 
trade exchange between Russia and the EU justifies the applicability of this term to the EU-Russia 
case in the eyes of both the naturally optimistic and the people whose job description predisposes 
them to promote the optimistic view. At the same time, more importantly, this conveniently 
distracts attention from existing concerns. 
The problem, however, is that from its inception the EU-Russian partnership was expected 
to become more than a simple exchange of Russian hydrocarbons for European-made machinery, 
medicine, food and, not least, luxury goods. It was seen as a process of incremental norm and value-
based rapprochement, potentially leading to integration, at least in certain fields. From this 
perspective, the results are not satisfactory. 
The fifth anniversary of the start of negotiations on a new framework agreement between 
the EU and Russia, which were – rather pompously – launched in June 2008, is highly unlikely to 
be crowned with the birth of a document. In fact, June 2013 the 10th anniversary of the agreement 
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on the so-called ‘four Common Spaces’, which envisaged the introduction of common standards in 
the economy, external security, justice and home affairs, and culture, education and research will be 
even gloomier. Strategically speaking, the two parties are as far from implementing that deal as they 
were at the moment when the deal was concluded. And the 20th anniversary of the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement (2014) is promising to be yet another sad reminder of the failure to move 
towards the goal which was once set: harmonization of norms between the EU and Russia. 
On a practical level, the partners show signs of exhaustion. Expectations are low. Summits 
are routinely held twice a year, often in exotic locations in Russia, and the dialogue is said to go on, 
but the last tangible agreement – on visa liberalization – was initialed as far back as October 2005 
and came into force in July 2007 (Russian WTO entry is not a bilateral compromise as such). 
Furthermore, Moscow openly declares that it would like “to catch China’s winds in Russia’s 
economic sails” and, to the extent possible, to reorient its ties to Asia and the Pacific1. By so saying, 
it reveals Russia’s vision of its future partnership with Europe – or rather the decline of interest 
towards it. As for the latter, the critical image of Russia in the European media indicates well that it 
also sees the limits of interaction clearly enough. 
 
The dreams that did not come true 
The key areas, where the gap between the two sides is widening, include the following. 
First of all, it is in the field of energy. True, on the one hand, the mutual EU-Russian 
complementarity in this field remains the backbone of economic interdependence. But on the other 
hand, years of arguments, resulting in the failure to create a mechanism that would guarantee 
reciprocal security of supply, demand, transit and investment have taken a heavy toll and 
undermined mutual confidence. In 2009, Russia withdrew from the Energy Charter Treaty, thus 
ruling out the prospect of cooperation that would make possible the transit of Caspian and Central 
Asian hydrocarbons to Europe. Gas wars between Russia and Ukraine in 2006 and 2009, which 
affected several EU member states, have shaken Russia’s reputation as Europe’s reliable energy 
supplier and provoked Brussels into responding by making sure that energy will remain a 
commodity only; not an instrument to promote the political status of Russia as an “energy 
superpower”. In 2011, the so-called “third energy package” entered into force in the EU which 
                                                          
1 See V.Putin. Rossiya v menyayushchemsya mire (Russia in a changing world), Moskovskie novosti, 27 February 2012, 
http://mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html . 
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requires energy companies to “unbundle” production, transportation and sales. Moscow interprets 
this legislation as working directly against Russia’s economic interests. The September 2012 launch 
of the European Commission’s investigation aimed at preventing the possible abuse of Russian 
Gazprom’s monopoly status in certain EU member states, as well as the regulator’s efforts to 
promote a truly common European energy market, have visibly irritated Moscow.  
This tug of war is likely to continue. Russia has powerful allies at the company level and 
other well-developed lobbying instruments to defend its positions. Yet, for the EU, applying the 
regulations in full is crucial, not only for economic reasons – to increase the competition and lower 
the energy prices in its domestic market – but even more so in order to maintain institutional 
credibility. 
Second, the political objectives of the EU and Russia in their Common Neighbourhood are 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to reconcile. Europe may not have the resources, or the understanding 
as to how to achieve its goals, but it would certainly want to see the region transforming and 
moving towards the goals of liberal democracy and a functioning market economy. Unlike in the 
case of Russia itself, which Europe has acquiesced to deal with it “as it is”, the status quo in the 
region – let alone regress in terms of the development of democratic institutions, as it was witnessed 
in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych – is not seen as acceptable. The EU has made its 
most promising regional partners the best offer it could: a deep and comprehensive free-trade area 
and an association agreement. This decision was of fundamental importance in its own right. It 
showed that de facto the EU policy towards its immediate Eastern periphery was decoupled from 
relations with Russia. Indeed, to a visible extent, this policy runs parallel with the latter, thus 
implicitly denying Russian veto power and the droit de regard in the region. 
The Kremlin does not welcome these prospects. It hopes to increase its own influence 
across the region, but can only hope to do so if the old, non-transparent, “post-Soviet” rules of the 
game are preserved. One is free not to accept the journalistic cliché of a “geopolitical rivalry”, but 
the clash of conceptual approaches is undeniable, and this has profound implications in practical 
policy. The EU-Ukraine free trade and association would be at odds with Moscow’s preference to 
bring Ukraine into the Russia-led Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan. The deterioration 
of Europe’s relations with Minsk, which followed the repression of opposition after the 2010 
presidential election, contrasts starkly with the international protection and economic support 
rendered to the Belarusian regime by Moscow, eliminating the last illusions about a possible joint 
or coordinated EU-Russian course vis-à-vis the regime in Minsk, which some in the EU had 
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harboured in the past. The lack of practical measures taken to implement the 2010 Meseberg 
memorandum between Russian president Dmitry Medvedev and German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel, aimed at bringing progress to the resolution of the conflict in Transnistria, demonstrates 
that the Kremlin does not intend to assist Moldova’s integration with the EU in any way. 
Third, disagreements on security matters run deep. Long gone are the days of the Russian-
German-French axis which emerged during the preparation for the US-led invasion of Iraq. Today, 
Russia and the EU are on opposite sides concerning a long list of issues from Kosovo to Georgia. 
Moscow’s cooperation with the West on Libya was an exception, whereas the diplomatic conflict 
on Syria is the rule. The two-year discussion of the Russian proposal to conclude a new European 
Security Treaty only underlined the reality: whereas Russia’s EU partners together with the US 
believe that a European security order based on the OSCE and NATO is adequate and does not need 
structural changes, Moscow finds the situation once again placing Russia in an inferior position. 
Meanwhile, Russia’s own planned increase in defence expenditure – in a situation when the country 
withdrew from the treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe – gradually starts to provoke concerns 
in the neighbouring EU member states at least. 
Fourth, the value gap is widening. The hopes for political liberalization in Russia have 
waned after Vladimir Putin returned as the country’s president. For economic interaction, this is not 
a critical impediment. However, the strengthening of a system of governance which is known for its 
corruption, selective justice, lack of rule of law and many other ills, establishes a context which is 
not conducive for partnership. Europeans do not envisage many new opportunities emerging in 
Russia in the years to come. This does not make Russia “evil” or a “threat”, but it does stimulate 
business people to look beyond Russia and to look for better chances elsewhere. 
In addition, it is obvious today that the “pilot projects” which were used to circumvent the 
general stagnation have not worked as hoped. Primarily, this concerns the much-advertised 
“partnerships for Russia’s modernization”. Well-intentioned – they were seen as a way around an 
impasse in the negotiations on the new framework agreement – the multiple “modernization 
partnerships” remain declarative and largely lack substance. From the institutional point of view, it 
is a step back if compared with commitments taken before (the same “common spaces”, for 
instance, or obligations within the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, which formally 
remains the legal base of the relations, even if not fully complied with). From the political point of 
view, it deprives the EU of initiative and conditionality instruments. If Russia chooses to 
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modernize, the EU may be invited to get involved and help, but if not, there is nothing that Europe 
can do. The choice lies with Moscow in full. 
Visa liberalization is another example. This issue of utmost importance for ordinary 
citizens visa-free travel was recognized as a long-term policy goal many years ago. In practice, 
however, this goal was substituted with easing travel conditions for certain categories of people, 
which by definition had a privileged status (sportsmen, businessmen, researchers, close family 
members, and most of all – holders of diplomatic passports). At the moment of writing, a 
comprehensive visa-free travel between Russia and the EU is not in sight. The worsening human 
rights situation in Russia, which can potentially provoke a wave of asylum-seekers, is an additional 
factor in this regard, as it is a no less realistic concern than illegal labour migration. This outcome is 
especially regretful, since, for as long as Russia was initially a demandeur, the EU had a chance, 
however slim, to apply conditionality and to promote overall freedom of movement in Russia. But 
that chance seems to have been missed. Instead, the EU’s reluctance to demonstrate its willingness 
to really move towards visa freedom, even if strictly conditioned, helped the authorities to portray 
the EU negatively inside Russia. 
At the moment, the EU’s new hopes are linked with Russia’s recent entry to the WTO. 
From the political point of view, it goes without saying that Russia’s accession to the organization 
is a fact of primary significance. From the economic point of view, however, the effects should not 
be exaggerated. They will not dramatically change the picture described above.  
First, the WTO implementation process is prone to unpleasant surprises. From September 
1, 2012, for instance, Russia introduced a new recycling fee on imported cars, which nullifies the 
tariff deduction. This measure is fully legal, but it does not correspond with the spirit of the 
agreement. And this may only be the beginning. The above-mentioned Customs Union may further 
complicate things. The reason is not economic protectionism per se. It is rather the philosophy, 
according to which an automatic application of any externally-set rules should not be allowed in 
Russia since it undermines the political control and loyalties inside the country. Second, in relative 
terms, trade creation effects will not be large. It is estimated that EU exports to Russia will grow by 
up to 3.9 billion euros annually – if everything goes right2. But in 2011, EU exports to Russia grew 
by almost 22 billion euros, thanks to the high price on the Russian exported hydrocarbons, which 
                                                          
2  EU welcomes Russia’s WTO accession after 18 years of negotiations. European Commission Press Release IP/12/96, 
Brussels, 22 August 2012 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/12/906&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLang
uage=en  
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enabled Russia to increase imports. This means that the final impact may be for the markets to 
decide, and this is not an optimistic assumption in a time of global economic uncertainty. Third, in 
comparison with the full free trade, which is realistically achievable between the EU and Ukraine or 
the EU and Moldova, the WTO-linked tariff reductions in Russia do not appear to be an 
overachievement, once again underlining the fact that, institutionally, EU-Russian economic 
partnership lags behind. 
 
Is there good news? 
This grim picture is not a novelty. What is new is the change in attitudes to it3. 
Traditionally, Moscow used to express a very self-confident approach. It behaved as if it 
thought that it would always be able to dictate to the EU the conditions of a compromise and saw 
nothing “dramatic” in the absence of a compromise at all. There were several reasons for that. One 
was a generally dismissive view of the EU as an economic club with limited police functions and no 
prospect of having a real common foreign and security policy. Moscow’s proven capability to use 
bilateral ties with several member states to undermine the common line supported that view. 
Another reason was Europe’s consent to pursue so-called pragmatic interests in relations with 
Russia and to pay only lip service to liberal values. In other words, Moscow assumed, and had good 
grounds for this assumption, that money, or the promise of money, would buy influence and 
attraction. 
Yet another reason was the EU’s weakening position inside Russia. The pro-EU 
constituency in the country was indeed shrinking. Europe’s objective difficulties were extensively 
reported to draw a picture of an approaching catastrophe. In parallel, the general public was 
constantly reminded of the EU’s “unfriendliness”, as on the visa issue, while the pro-European 
liberals were frustrated with the EU’s apparent readiness to trade economic benefits for liberal 
principles. In the eyes of Moscow, the best proof of the validity of this self-confident approach was 
the EU’s line in autumn 2008, after the Russian-Georgian crisis, when relations cooled for some 
time, as the EU reportedly needed “to review” its approach to Russia, but then quickly returned to 
“business as usual”. 
                                                          
3 I dealt more with some of these issues in A. Moshes. Russia’s European Policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a 
new compromise? International Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 1 (2012), pp. 17-30. 
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Indeed, an impression was created that it was the EU, more so than Russia that needed an 
unproblematic relationship. But in the same autumn of 2008, with the arrival of the global economic 
crisis, the situation started to change – slowly, but surely. In fact,  in November 2008, by the 
publication of the “Review of EU-Russian relations”, a clear signal was sent that set the right 
perspective. The document concluded that the EU can be firm in its relations with Russia since 
Russia needs the EU markets no less than the EU needs Russia4. 
But the real game-changer was the evolution in the global gas market. Due to the arrival of 
new technologies, of liquefied and especially shale gas, the mantra of the lack of alternatives to the 
energy partnership with Russia was forgotten. And even though the issue remains complex and the 
fight between the lobbyists continues, the strategic picture does not justify exaggerated worries 
about “freezing in the winter”. Instead, it is Gazprom’s turn now to guarantee sales by offering price 
discounts and other benefits to major European consumers. Meanwhile, it is also becoming clear 
that Russia’s plans to re-orient energy export to China and other Asian markets can be implemented 
only to a very small extent. As a result, the EU-Russian energy relationship is ceasing to be a 
security issue, and is progressively becoming a commercial one, which boosts the EU’s confidence 
and makes the Commission an appropriate authority to deal with it. 
On a separate note, today, the EU is closer to a common position on Russia than ever 
before. On the one hand, the “new” member states, which are now sending their second generation 
of EU commissioners and European Parliament members to Brussels, are better able to make 
themselves heard within the EU and are less worried that their interests are being discussed with 
outsiders behind their backs. On the other handsome of the “old” and “big” states, Germany in 
particular, are growing more critical and frustrated with false expectations and illusions in their 
relations with Russia5. For this reason, they do not appear ready to continue to pursue their own 
mercantile interests in Russia or the Eastern Neighbourhood more generally at the expense of the 
common agenda. 
Somewhat paradoxically, perhaps, the EU-Russian relationship now looks more like a 
relationship of equals than at any time previously. If expectations are low, they are equally low. If 
all parties decide to take this relationship further, one party will not be expected (nor interested) to 
contribute or sacrifice more than the other. 
                                                          
4 Review of EU-Russian Relations. Memo/08/876, Brussels, November 5, 2008. 
5 See more in H.Adomeit. German-Russian relations. Balance sheet since 2000 and perspectives until 2025. IFRI etude 
prospective & strategic, 2012.  
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What to do? 
At the moment, however, radical changes are hardly possible. The EU-Russian strategic 
partnership was designed for a different Russia – less rich, but more pluralist and “European-
minded”, more able to realize that the Europe of the 21st century is not a geographic or historic 
concept, but an entity based on certain norms and rules. Therefore, EU-Russian relations are, and 
will be, to a large extent a function of Russia’s domestic choices. A primitive trade exchange is for 
the foreseeable future possible with any regime. But a sustainable strategic interaction on either 
bilateral or global issues could take place only if Russia profoundly changed internally, if it made 
itself more open and guaranteed security of investment, if it fought corruption and moved towards a 
rule-of-law state. In view of the record of Russia’s current administration, however, this would be 
too much to expect. 
In these circumstances the minimalist approach – “dealing with Russia as it as” – may be 
the only option available in practice, for the time-being at least. Such an approach by Brussels is 
acceptable for Moscow, as it gives the Kremlin full freedom in its domestic politics and does not 
interfere with the plans of Russia’s ruling circles to perpetuate their stay in power. It is acceptable 
for Europe in a situation when Russia’s challenge in either economic or soft power terms is not as 
strong as it was feared some years ago. In addition, it is well-known that small expectations are the 
best safeguard against disillusionment. In view of this, it is better not to have a new framework 
agreement at all, than to have a bad one or to tolerate non-compliance, as it sometimes happened 
before. 
But a strong warning against complacency is needed, notably the conviction that time and 
markets will “do the job”, that a rule-based, European pattern will somehow become the role-model 
for Russia. Many within the EU seem to underestimate the risk of importing the ills which they 
believe only exist on the Russian side of the divide, ills like corruption and non-transparent 
practices. The EU should be advised to increase the efforts at enforcing their own rules at home. In 
particular, the EU should continue the work to build a common energy market. It should fight 
against monopolism, distortion of competition, and seek to further diversify sources of energy 
supply. 
The EU and its member states should pay greater attention to the lobbying practices at 
play, which threaten the success of this policy. It has been convincingly argued by some analysts, 
that the EU needs greater transparency in the operations of foreign-financed consultancies and the 
 
9 
 
work of former EU and government officials in the service of external energy companies6. 
Meanwhile, it is high time to increase the security of confidential information. 
But the challenge to “put one’s own house in order” and build proper firewalls, however 
big they need to be, pales in comparison with the need to reach out to Russia. The EU has to learn 
to speak “beyond Putin” – i.e. beyond conservative ruling elites, to by-pass the ineffectual 
bureaucratic interface and to engage with the wider public. The actual size of the pro-European 
constituency in Russia is not known. As observed in this paper, it has been shrinking under the 
impact of different factors. And yet, sympathies to Europe exist, and its power of attraction extends 
rather far. The EU has to identify the needs and expectations of this constituency, to address those 
needs, while at the same time informing this constituency better about the EU’s own interests and 
policy in Russia. And the first thing to do in order to engage with this community is to restore its 
own credibility as an actor which cares about European values and wants to promote them 
externally. 
In its current shape the EU-Russian strategic partnership is less and less worth its name. If 
the EU wants to change the trend, it should start thinking about how to contribute to fundamental 
transformations inside Russia. 
                                                          
6 For details see K.Smith. Unconventional Gas and European Security: Politics and Foreign Policy of Fracking in 
Europe. CSIS paper, 2012, p.13.  
